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1. Introduction
It has often been observed that orderly behavior is a prominent feature of 
Japanese society, and that the Japanese people value high levels of cooperation. 
These traits may reflect a characteristic quality of the Japanese, who are relatively 
unwilling to make decisions by majority vote and tend to prefer building 
consensus or reaching unanimous agreements.
After the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, the Japanese 
people’s orderly behavior was readily apparent in the affected area, as residents 
unable to obtain food waited patiently in line to receive rations. The Japanese 
attitude of keeping order rather than scrambling to grab the required supplies was 
highly praised around the world. Furthermore, there was no panic, even after the 
accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. When a Korean reporter 
wrote an article highlighting this calm behavior,1 many Japanese must have 
wondered why the reporter found it unusual.
Yamagishi (1998, 1999) has sought to analyze this characteristic Japanese 
behavior by employing Putnam’s (1993) concept of social capital, which divided 
“trust,” as an expectation about another person’s intentions, into “safety” and 
“trust (in the narrow sense).” The difference between the two rests on whether 
social uncertainty is present; trust (in the narrow sense) is required if social 
uncertainty exists, but safety is involved if social uncertainty does not exist. 
According to Yamagishi’s analysis, the orderly behavior of the Japanese results 
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from the existence of a safe society, and people might employ another approach 
when social uncertainty is high.
Yamagishi’s analysis is based on a psychosocial approach. However, there 
also exists a significant body of research on Japanese cooperativeness based on 
public choice theory, which is referred to as “commons research.” Ostrom (1990) 
indicated that it is necessary for institutions and norms to be formed voluntarily in 
order to avoid the “tragedy of the commons”; she described Japanese mechanisms 
such as “forest owned in common” and “common land” as detailed examples of 
ways to avoid this “tragedy.”
However, it is difficult to apply these findings to the cooperative behavior of 
the Japanese in the context of the 2011 earthquake and nuclear disaster that 
powerfully disturbed Japan’s image as a safe society. Furthermore, commons 
research does not discuss responses to unexpected disasters (Kira and Kawamura 
2014). Therefore, we need further information to explain how and why the 
Japanese continue to practice cooperation when a natural disaster occurs.
The above-referenced article written by a Korean reporter provides some 
clues to a possible answer. This reporter observed that the Japanese people 
appeared to confidently rely on their government, although the government’s 
response to the nuclear accident was inadequate. Drawing on this observation, we 
propose that confidence in the government is a key explanatory concept typifying 
the Japanese.
Immediately after the earthquake, although it would have been expected for 
some people to embark on a desperate search for required supplies, the affected 
residents waited patiently in line. One resident commented, “I can get supplies if I 
line up here.” His remark demonstrated a high level of confidence that the 
government could be relied on to deliver assistance. Building on this example, in 
this paper we consider whether the Japanese people’s orderly behavior in the wake 
of the Great East Japan Earthquake was a result of their confidence in their 
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government.
Since Putnam’s (1993) discussion of social capital, there have been numerous 
debates about confidence in social institutions, as well as experimental studies of 
areas affected by natural disasters (Aldrich 2012; Page et al. 2014). However, 
there has been little research on voters’ confidence in and evaluation of their 
government following a disaster. Samuels’s (2013) study on political influence 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake is a rare exception. Samuels interviewed 
politicians and public officials and investigated the government’s response after 
the earthquake; however, his study focused on the Japanese elite and contains 
minimal information on the cooperative behavior of affected residents.
Understanding residents’ opinions is indispensable while investigating their 
confidence in the government. Interviews and surveys are both appropriate 
methods for assessing residents’ opinions. However, most academic investigations 
of the Great East Japan Earthquake and its aftermath have involved interviews 
(Tanaka et al. 2013; Takaura et al. 2013; Gill et al. 2013) rather than surveys 
(Kawamura 2013; Ikeda 2016). There are few surveys because it is difficult to 
construct a suitable sampling frame and because Japanese researchers have had 
little capacity to conduct scientifically reliable surveys of the affected population. 
Interviews are a useful mechanism of recording the actual voices of affected 
residents, but interview data do not reliably indicate overall social trends.
In this paper, we use survey data rather than interview data to investigate the 
overall opinions of residents in the affected area. Fortunately, we have statistical 
data2 from the “Opinion Survey of Residents of the Four Prefectures Affected by 
2 Basic information about this survey is as follows. 
Population: residents of the four prefectures affected by the earthquake who were over 
twenty years of age at the time; sample size: 4,000 (1,000 from each prefecture); survey 
period: May to August 2014; method: mail survey; number of responses: 1,715 (43.2% 
response rate); person responsible for the survey project: Kazunori Kawamura, Associate 
Professor, Graduate School of Information Sciences, Tohoku University.
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the Earthquake (Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, and Ibaraki),” conducted by the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). This was one of the largest academic 
surveys administered in the area affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake, and 
the data are particularly useful because they permit comparisons between 
prefectures.
Table 1 shows the respondents’ answers to the question “Do you consider 
yourself a victim?” for each prefecture. The percentage of persons considering 
themselves as victims was the largest in Fukushima, the site of the nuclear 
accident, although even some Fukushima residents did not think of themselves as 
victims. In Iwate, the prefecture farthest from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant, the percentage of people who did not consider themselves victims 
significantly outnumbered those who did.
The following section examines differences in the level of confidence in the 
government among the affected prefectures. 
Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki all
Yes 29.45% 47.79% 72.35% 50.67% 48.92%
No 58.68% 42.92% 16.20% 38.13% 40.17%
DK 11.87% 9.29% 11.45% 11.20% 10.91%
Table 1. Answers to the question “Do you consider yourself a victim?” by prefecture
2. Evaluation of and Confidence in Government
2.1 Evaluation of the government’s response to the disaster
It has been observed that the mismanagement of the government’s response 
to the nuclear accident caused many people to criticize the ruling Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ). Do the data indicate that residents negatively evaluated the 
government’s response to the earthquake?
The survey included a question asking respondents to evaluate responses to 
the earthquake by a series of actors (the prime minister, their Diet member, the 
Governor, municipal officials, the police, fire authorities, the Self-Defense Forces, 
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and non-profit organizations) from immediately after the earthquake until one 
week later. The question had five possible answers: “evaluate as high,” “evaluate 
as average,” “evaluate as low,” “unable to evaluate,” and “don’t know (DK).”
Prime 
Minister
Diet 
Members
Governor
Municipal 
Officials
Police
Fire 
Authoriities
Self-
Defense 
Forces
NPO
high 1.65% 1.92% 16.64% 17.89% 33.05% 49.66% 66.28% 51.41%
average 21.60% 25.83% 46.08% 49.47% 49.87% 43.61% 29.72% 39.82%
low 33.95% 41.52% 24.28% 23.68% 13.23% 5.05% 3.14% 6.61%
unable 42.81% 30.73% 12.99% 8.95% 3.85% 1.68% 0.86% 2.16%
Table 2. Answers to the question “Can you evaluate each actor’s response to the earthquake?”
*NPO: Non-profit Organization
Source: Kawamura and Ito (2016), p327.
Figure 1. Percentage of respondents giving a high or average rating to the response by 
each of eight actor groups to the earthquake
Table 2 shows residents’ evaluation of each actor’s response to the 
earthquake, excluding “DK”. The evaluation of politicians, such as the prime 
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minister and Diet members, was relatively unfavorable, with only about one-
quarter of the respondents rating their performance as high or average. In contrast, 
the evaluation of crisis management entities such as the police, fire authorities, 
and Self-Defense Forces was extremely high, demonstrating that the actors most 
closely involved with the residents were viewed very favorably.
Differences in evaluations across prefectures are shown in Figure 1. The 
graph shows the percentage of respondents giving high or average ratings. 
Although the residents of Fukushima and Ibaraki gave somewhat lower 
evaluations than those in the other two prefectures,3 the pattern is the same, in that 
the national government was rated poorly and crisis response entities most 
involved with the residents were rated very highly.
2.2 Confidence in the Government
We also investigated whether a similar trend could be observed regarding 
confidence in the government. The survey asked, “Are the government and public 
officials reliable?” Specifically, it asked respondents to indicate their confidence in 
the national, prefectural, and municipal governments, national officials, and local 
officials. There were five possible answers: “reliable,” “moderately reliable,” 
“barely reliable,” “unreliable,” and “DK.”
Government Public Officials
National Prefectural Municipal National Local
reliable 2.26% 3.37% 4.94% 1.56% 3.79%
moderately reliable 26.77% 45.04% 49.44% 25.81% 49.54%
barely reliable 51.35% 42.95% 37.36% 55.42% 39.16%
unreliable 19.62% 8.64% 8.26% 17.21% 7.51%
Table 3. Answers to the survey question “Are the government and public officials 
reliable?”
3 We would suggest that the evaluations were lower in Fukushima because the nuclear 
disaster occurred there and in Ibaraki because it was not categorized as one of the 
prefectures directly affected by the earthquake.
149
Ibaragi, Bohács, and Kawamura　Japanese People＇s Attitudes toward the Government 
after the Great East Japan Earthquake: Who Rely on the Government?
National Government Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki
reliable 2.18% 2.35% 1.14% 3.67%
moderately reliable 23.24% 25.88% 23.71% 33.90%
barely reliable 52.06% 51.29% 55.43% 46.61%
unreliable 22.52% 20.47% 19.71% 15.82%
Prefectural Government Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki
reliable 3.87% 4.19% 1.72% 3.61%
moderately reliable 45.76% 56.51% 34.77% 41.57%
barely reliable 42.86% 33.95% 51.72% 44.58%
unreliable 7.51% 5.35% 11.78% 10.24%
Municipal Government Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki
reliable 5.81% 4.83% 3.75% 5.71%
moderately reliable 51.09% 53.33% 40.92% 50.29%
barely reliable 34.87% 36.32% 43.52% 36.29%
unreliable 8.23% 5.52% 11.82% 7.71%
National Officials Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki
reliable 1.04% 1.23% 1.58% 2.76%
moderately reliable 25.59% 24.94% 22.47% 30.37%
barely reliable 55.61% 56.54% 58.54% 51.53%
unreliable 17.75% 17.28% 17.41% 15.34%
Local Officials Iwate Miyagi Fukushima Ibaraki
reliable 3.50% 3.82% 2.47% 5.31%
moderately reliable 51.00% 54.89% 44.75% 46.02%
barely reliable 38.50% 35.08% 43.83% 41.30%
unreliable 7.00% 6.21% 8.95% 7.37%
Table 4. Answers to the survey question “Are the government and public officials 
reliable?” by prefecture
Table 3 shows the rate of confidence in government and public officials, 
excluding “DK”. One-quarter of the respondents assessed the national government 
and public officials as reliable or moderately reliable, and half of the respondents 
assessed the local government and public officials similarly, suggesting that the 
residents of the disaster area had greater confidence in local governments and 
public officials. This finding is similar to the results described previously.
Differences in confidence levels between prefectures are shown in Table 4. 
Some minor variations—for example, the proportion of residents assessing the 
government and public officials as reliable or moderately reliable was higher in 
Miyagi and lower in Fukushima—were observed but no significant differences 
were seen across prefectures. 
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2.3 Discussion
In this section, we analyzed respondents’ evaluations of the government’s 
response to the earthquake and their confidence in the government. The results 
demonstrate that the Japanese people evaluated crisis response services very 
favorably and expressed more confidence in government and public officials at the 
local than at the national level. These results from prefecture-level data are consistent 
with those of Ikeda (2010) and Kawamura (2013, 2014). Local government activities 
are more visible, therefore residents in the area affected by the earthquake could see 
the activities of disaster response agencies and the local government more readily. 
We propose that people maintained social order and did not organize large 
demonstrations or protests, despite the occurrence of a nuclear accident, because of 
their high level of confidence in the local government and in crisis responders.
Such a result may be unthinkable in Korea, which has more centralized 
government structures than Japan. When the Sewol ferry accidently sunk, many 
passengers died due to initial response mismanagement. The response to the 
Fukushima nuclear accident exhibited similar mismanagement, and both accidents 
prompted a loss of confidence in the respective national governments. Many 
Koreans condemned President Park Geun-Hye over the Sewol incident, and large 
demonstrations were organized. Even a year after the accident, demonstrators 
continued to clash with the police.4 The Korean people have a low level of 
confidence in local government, in contrast to the Japanese, because Korea has 
centralized government structures. It might be a rational decision for them to 
protest against their national government when natural disasters occur.
3. Multivariate Analysis
In section 2, we analyzed respondents’ performance evaluations and their 
confidence in the government separately. Whereas the former question asked 
4 Yomiuri Shimbun, April 19, 2015.
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respondents to describe their views immediately after the earthquake, the latter 
question inquired about their confidence at the time of the survey, more than three 
years later. We thus wished to investigate the possibility of a causal relation 
between evaluation and confidence: does a respondent who evaluates the 
government highly therefore have a high level of confidence in the government? 
In section 3, we focus on this potential causal relationship.
3.1 Principal Component Analysis
Variables denoting evaluation and confidence were needed for the regression 
analysis. As described in section 2, respondents were asked to evaluate the 
performance of eight groups of actors and to describe their confidence in three levels 
of government and two sets of public officials. We extracted the principal components 
from these questions to create two variables, “evaluation” and “confidence.”
evaluation 1 2 confidence 1
Prime Minister 0.35 0.67 National Government 0.72 
Diet Members 0.52 0.65 Prefectural Government 0.86 
Governor 0.66 0.39 Municipal Government 0.81 
Municipal Officials 0.73 0.11 National Public Officials 0.78 
Police 0.78 -0.23 Local Public Officials 0.84 
Fire Authorities 0.76 -0.41 Contribution ratio（%） 64.476
Self-Defense Forces 0.70 -0.45 
NPO 0.59 -0.18 
Contribution ratio（%） 42.467 18.607
Table 5. Principal component analysis (left: evaluation; right: confidence)
Table 5 shows the results of the principal component analyses. Two principal 
components with a specific value greater than one were extracted from the 
analyses. The first principal component recorded large positive values in all fields. 
When the respondent rated all actors highly, the extracted value was also high. 
The second principal component combined positive values for politicians and 
negative values for crisis response services. When the actors more closely 
involved with the residents were rated highly, the extracted value was low. We 
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labeled the first principal component “evaluation.”
A similar principal component analysis of confidence in the government 
yielded a principal component with a specific value greater than one. This 
component indicated that when the respondent rated confidence in all governments 
highly, the extracted value was also high. We labeled this component “confidence.”
The correlation coefficient between “evaluation” and “confidence” was 
positive, 0.46 (significant at the .01 level). 
3.2 Multiple Regression Analysis
We performed a multiple regression analysis with “evaluation” as the 
independent variable and “confidence” as the dependent variable. The variables 
used in the regression analysis are shown in Table 6. The variables other than 
“evaluation” and “confidence” can be classified into two categories: “extent of 
damage” and “personal.” “Extent of damage” has four dummy variables, and a 
larger scores for the dummy variables denotes lower confidence in the 
government. The survey contained three questions on damage to the home: “the 
extent of rebuilding needed,” “the need to request a contractor to carry out 
repairs,” and “the extent of repair work that I carried out myself.” We combined 
the first two of these as the variable “damage to the home.”
The other category “personal” comprises four variables: sex, education, duration 
of residence, and generation. Sex is a dummy variable counting a male as one, 
education is a dummy variable counting a respondent who was attending or had 
completed college or graduate school as one, and duration of residence is a dummy 
variable counting a respondent who had lived for more than a decade in the same 
place as one. With regard to age, Kawamura (2013), who conducted a survey in 
Sendai city, Miyagi prefecture, found that the relationship between age and evaluation 
of the government was not linear but U-shaped, because people in their fifties gave 
poorer evaluations of government’s activities than both younger and older persons. 
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We investigated whether the JSPS survey data displayed a similar U-shaped 
relationship between respondents’ age and confidence in the government. Figure 2 
shows the boxplot of the relationship between age and confidence in the government. 
The confidence level of people in their forties was relatively low whereas that for 
people in their twenties and seventies was higher, confirming the presence of a 
U-shaped relationship. Therefore, we referred to this variable as “generation.”
Obs Min Max Average Std.Dev
confidence 1408 -2.343 2.916 0 1 
evaluation 1181 -3.945 2.012 0 1 
Extent of Damage
damage to the home 1615 0 1 0.49 0.50 
injured myself 1615 0 1 0.01 0.10 
dead (relatives) 1615 0 1 0.09 0.29 
dead (acquaintances) 1615 0 1 0.18 0.39 
Personal
sex 1663 0 1 0.47 0.50 
education 1658 0 1 0.24 0.43 
duration of residence 1554 0 1 0.71 0.45 
generation 1653 1 3 1.71 0.76 
Table 6. Summary statistics
Figure 2. Boxplot showing the relationship between generation and confidence
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Regression analysis was initially performed with four dummy variables 
representing the four prefectures: Iwate dummy, Miyagi dummy, Fukushima 
dummy, and Ibaraki dummy, 5 but this resulted in multicollinearity.6 Therefore, we 
performed the analysis first without reference to a prefecture and then, as 
explained below in section 3.3, reanalyzed the data for each affected prefecture.
The regression analysis is shown in Table 7. When controlling for personal 
variables, the correlation between “confidence” and “evaluation” was significant 
at the .01 level, demonstrating that a higher evaluation of government was 
associated with greater confidence in the government. The personal variable of 
education was significantly correlated with “confidence” at the .01 level, 
demonstrating that respondents with higher education were more likely to have 
confidence in the government. Table 7 indicates, as noted above, that the 
“generation” variable was U-shaped and lowest for people in their forties. 
Duration of residence was significant at the .1 level. There was no difference 
between females and males and no significant correlation between “extent of 
damage” and “confidence.” In contrast, Kawamura’s analysis of Sendai survey 
data found a significant correlation between the extent of damage and evaluation. 
In our analysis, only one variable—having acquaintances who died in the 
disaster—was significant at the .1 level, and no other damage-related variables 
were significantly correlated with confidence. The results demonstrate that the 
extent of damage did not affect confidence in the government among residents in 
areas affected by the earthquake.
5 For example, Iwate dummy is a dummy variable counting a respondent who lived in 
Iwate as one.
6 In the survey, an answer choice of “other” was offered for the question about 
prefecture. Therefore, we defined “other” as the reference category and created four 
dummy variables.
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confidence B S.E.
constant 0.071 0.104 
evaluation 0.471 0.029 ***
damage to the home 0.005 0.058 
injured myself 0.085 0.277 
dead (relatives) -0.031 0.101 
dead (acquaintances) -0.146 0.075 *
sex 0.252 0.069 ***
education 0.065 0.059 
duration of residence 0.114 0.067 *
generation -0.146 0.039 ***
R-squared 0.249 
Adj R-squared 0.241 
N 911 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
　　　　　 Table 7. Overall regression
3.3 Regression analysis by area
Figure 3 shows that the distribution of confidence levels differs by area. We 
performed a multiple regression analysis, dividing the data by prefecture. The 
other variables used for this analysis were the same as those used in section 3.2.7
7 The main purpose of section 3.3 is to compare results in four prefectures affected by 
the earthquake; therefore, respondents indicating “other” as their residence have been 
excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 3. Boxplot showing the relationship between confidence and prefecture
Table 8 shows the results of multiple regression analysis performed using 
four models, one for each prefecture. All models show that “evaluation” was 
significantly correlated with “confidence.” In contrast, most of the variables 
concerned with the extent of damage did not have a significant correlation with 
“confidence,” as observed for the overall results in section 3.2 above; only the 
variable “dead acquaintances” in Miyagi was significant at the .01 level. 
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confidence (Iwate) confidence (Miyagi)
B S.E. B S.E.
constant -0.160 0.191 -0.245 0.187 
evaluation 0.492 0.055 *** 0.468 0.062 ***
damage to the home -0.010 0.119 0.051 0.102 
injured myself 0.975 0.868 0.138 0.371 
dead (relatives) 0.042 0.164 0.090 0.146 
dead (acquaintances) -0.030 0.126 -0.301 0.110 ***
sex 0.124 0.139 -0.108 0.111 
education 0.398 0.111 *** 0.246 0.103 **
duration of residence 0.204 0.120 * 0.158 0.109 
generation -0.101 0.078 0.027 0.067 
R-squared 0.290 0.217 
Adj R-squared 0.264 0.190 
N 259 266 
confidence (Fukushima) confidence (Ibaraki)
B S.E. B S.E.
constant 0.440 0.234 * 0.180 0.284 
evaluation 0.475 0.059 *** 0.492 0.077 ***
damage to the home 0.042 0.123 -0.001 0.154 
injured myself 0.211 0.611 -0.785 0.715 
dead (relatives) -0.314 0.261 0.712 0.713 
dead (acquaintances) 0.014 0.188 0.418 0.700 
sex 0.177 0.160 0.057 0.176 
education 0.070 0.120 0.271 0.158 
duration of residence 0.092 0.154 0.082 0.183 
generation -0.435 0.079 *** -0.102 0.100 
R-squared 0.349 0.251 
Adj R-squared 0.320 0.209 
N 212 169 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
       Table 8. Regression by prefecture
Moreover, in Fukushima, the correlation of “confidence” with “generation” 
was U-shaped and significant at the .01 level, but in the other three prefectures 
there was no significant correlation between “generation” and confidence in the 
government.
3.4 Discussion
Two points emerging from the multiple regression analysis merit discussion. 
First, the variable “dead acquaintances” was significant at the .01 level in Miyagi. 
We think that this result may be related to the particular dynamics of Sendai city 
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in Miyagi prefecture; many affected residents moved there as it was a center for 
post-earthquake restoration and reconstruction. However, many people who were 
unaffected by the disaster also moved to Sendai to look for work. The subsequent 
increase in the diversity of the Sendai population may have caused this result. 
Second, the fact that the “generation” variable was U-shaped and significant 
at the .01 level only in Fukushima may be explicable in terms of the residents’ life 
status. In a previous study, Kawamura (2013) suggested that “generation” was 
U-shaped because people in their fifties had begun to be conscious of approaching 
old age, and the earthquake had shattered their plans for the future. This factor 
may also apply to our results. Many people have been unable to return home since 
the nuclear accident, and in some cases it remains uncertain whether they will 
ever be able to return home, so it is natural for them to worry about their future. 
Further, we identified two variables as significant at the .01 level or the .1 
level in the regression analysis presented in section 3.2. Both these results may 
have been influenced by the distinctive experiences of Sendai (in Miyagi 
prefecture) or Fukushima.
It is generally believed that confidence in the government is shaped through a 
combination of post-event evaluations of actual performance and prior 
expectations about the system (Akizuki 2010). In other words, it is reasonable to 
assume that evidence of significant capacity for crisis management, including the 
government’s ability to prevent disasters, persuaded residents to follow the 
government’s advice when a natural disaster occurs—in other words, that they 
could have a high level of confidence in the government. Disaster drills have been 
held regularly by each community, school, and neighborhood association in Japan 
on September 1, which is Disaster Preparedness Day. Such disaster drills enable 
the Japanese people, beginning from their childhood, to accumulate knowledge 
about disaster prevention and to recognize from experience that the government 
has made advance preparations to prevent and mitigate disasters so that order can 
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be maintained in the affected area.
The idea that residents should follow the government’s direction when natural 
disasters occur was demonstrated with regard to the establishment of temporary 
housing. Kira and Kawamura (2014) identified through surveys that residents’ 
associations were formed in temporary housing in Ishinomaki city, Miyagi 
prefecture, although the residents did not know each other. Half of the associations 
were formed through the initiation of people outside temporary housing, such as 
government workers and volunteers. Commons research, referred to earlier, 
suggests that residents’ associations usually form spontaneously from existing 
social capital (Kira and Kawamura 2014: 143–144). However, residents’ 
associations in temporary housing in Ishinomaki were formed largely by outsiders, 
again indicating that high confidence in local government induced people to 
follow the government’s initiation. 
In section 3, the existence of a causal relationship between evaluation and 
confidence in the government was demonstrated through sequential correlations. 
However, as Akizuki (2010) suggested, the relationship between the two factors is 
circular, we should therefore remember that high confidence in the government 
might also lead to a high evaluation of the government. Future research should 
consider this possibility.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have focused on evaluations of and confidence in the 
government following the Great East Japan Earthquake among residents of 
Japan’s four affected prefectures. The analysis revealed that people gave low post-
earthquake ratings for national politicians but high ratings for crisis response 
services. Confidence in the local governments was higher than in the national 
government. Both the evaluation of and confidence in the actors most closely 
connected to affected residents were extremely favorable. 
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We also considered whether the respondents who evaluated government 
performance highly had high levels of confidence in the government. We 
performed multiple regression analysis with two variables, “evaluation” and 
“confidence,” obtained by principal component analysis. The results revealed that 
higher evaluations were indeed correlated with higher levels of confidence in the 
government, even when the data were analyzed by prefecture. Some minor 
differences were observed among the prefectures, such as the correlation of 
confidence with extent of damage in Miyagi and with age in Fukushima.
The results suggest that residents of the affected area could continue living in 
an orderly fashion because their high confidence in the local government led them 
to agree that they should follow the government’s direction when natural disasters 
occur and because this approach was supported by the regular disaster drills.
These actions might be unique to Japan, a country that is prone to many 
disasters. It can be expected that a country where natural disasters are highly 
likely to occur will spend more time and money preparing for them as compared 
with other countries. Japan’s practice of holding regular disaster drills has 
contributed to the widespread confidence and trust that people have in their 
government and its guidance in times of disaster. In this case, the Japanese people 
waited patiently in line for supplies because of their confidence that the 
government was certain to provide the supplies needed. They were also making a 
rational decision that waiting in a queue was more likely to result in receiving 
goods or resources than going out to search for supplies on their own. 
This rational decision-making is less likely to occur in countries that 
experience fewer natural disasters, because such countries are less likely to be 
well prepared in crisis management. Moreover, if those governments were to 
spend more money on disaster prevention, their citizens might criticize them for 
wasting money. In fact, when a person was suspected of having the MERS virus 
in Korea, the Korean government’s mismanagement of its initial response 
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contributed to the spread of the infection. President Park later commented, “We 
had a weakness in our initial response.”8 Arguably, this poor performance was due 
to lack of preparation. The impact of the earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand 
in 2011 (magnitude 6.3), in which 185 people died, bears similarities to this 
Korean episode. When Christchurch suffered a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0) 
in 2010, there were no casualties, although several buildings were severely 
damaged and roads cracked in several places; on the other hand, the strong 
aftershocks that occurred about six months later caused many buildings to 
collapse. The earlier earthquake had weakened the buildings, and many of them 
were fragile because insufficient money had been spent to bring them up to the 
standard required to make them sufficiently resistant to earthquakes.
It may not seem rational for countries with fewer natural disasters to spend 
money to prevent disasters that may never occur. However, as the cases of Korea 
and New Zealand demonstrate, it is too late once the disaster has occurred. It can 
be hoped that in the future, Japanese knowledge of disaster prevention will bring 
major benefits to Southeast Asia and Oceania.
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